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JUDICIAL PROFESSIONALISM AND THE RELATIONS
BETWEEN JUDGES AND LAWYERS
RANDALL T. SHEPARD*
When judges and lawyers discuss matters of ethics and legal
professionalism, we usually focus on the performance of lawyers.
We consider how lawyers relate to clients, how they relate to each
other, how they behave in court, and similar topics. Legal litera-
ture is chock full of analysis on these points, and the appellate
disciplinary authorities issue multiple opinions each year cover-
ing much of the same territory.
While our profession also examines judicial behavior, that
part of the debate is but a sliver of the whole. The number of
appellate opinions concerning judicial conduct is a fraction of
those about lawyers, and applicable monographs are few and far
between.
Least explored of all is how we lawyers and judges relate to
each other, what issues derive from the interaction between advo-
cate and adjudicator. While judges and lawyers are cut from the
same cloth, judges have many obligations that practitioners do
not. Many of the most ticklish of these have to do with the places
where judges and lawyers interact.
Here, I explore some of the professional and ethical ques-
tions that arise at various of these intersections, particularly judi-
cial communications with lawyers, activity in bar associations,
disqualifications because of relationships with lawyers, business
dealings with lawyers, and campaign contributions made by
lawyers.
I. WHAT is Ex PARTE ANYWAY?
As early as law school or bar review courses, we lawyers
accept the basic notion that "ex parte communications are pro-
hibited." This directive is at least as old as our profession's first
formal canons.' Modern professional rules memorialize it as a
* Chief Justice of Indiana. A.B., Princeton University, 1969; J.D., Yale
Law School, 1972; LL.M., University of Virginia School of Law, 1995.
1. After the American Bar Association promulgated the Canons of Profes-
sionalEthics for Lawyers in 1908, the Association turned its attention to preparing
a statement of ethics forjudges. The Association created a Committee on Judi-
cial Ethics, chaired by ChiefJustice William Howard Taft. The Taft Committee
developed the Canons of Judicial Ethics, and the ABA annual meeting of 1924
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duty applicable to both lawyers and judges. 2 Still, lawyers and
judges spend many of their days working closely together, and
the judicial code recognizes that communication is part of what
makes for an effective court system. It thus creates a series of
exceptions to the general prohibition of ex parte exchanges,
most notably the exception permitting communication on
"administrative matters."3
In trying to define good practice and bad, we readily identify
as out of bounds communication that is far too weighty to ignore.
In re Cooks4 is such an example. In that case, a judge was cen-
sured for failing to recuse herself after she participated in ex
parte communications with both a party and that party's attor-
ney, among other things. When visiting her mother in the hospi-
tal, Judge Cooks stopped by to see one Jane Abshire, whose case
was pending. During this visit, Abshire "proclaimed to Judge
Cooks that she was 'innocent." 5
After the hospital visit, Abshire babysat and tutored one of
the judge's children after school two or three times a week.
Judge Cooks paid Abshire $355.00 "to reimburse... Abshire for
adopted them. See Forty-Seventh Annual Meeting Maintains Association's High Stan-
dard, 10 A.B.A. J. 555, 555 (1924) (calling the Association's adoption of the
Canons "the outstanding feature of the meeting").
2. As on most points, the model developed by the ABA is the basis for
Indiana's rule:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other
official by means prohibited by law; [or]
(b) communicate ex parte with such person except as permitted
by law.
INDIANA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.5 (1996).
Ajudge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a pro-
ceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to
law. Ajudge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communi-
cations made to the judge outside the presence of the parties, con-
cerning a pending or impending proceeding.
INDIANA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B) (8) (1989).
3. (a) Where circumstances require, ex parte communications for
scheduling, administrative purposes or emergencies that do not deal
with substantive matters or issues on the merits are authorized;
provided:
(i) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a proce-
dural or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communica-
tion, and,
(ii) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties
of the substance of the ex parte communication and allows an
opportunity to respond.
INDIANA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(8)(a) (1989).
4. 694 So.2d 892 (La. 1997).
5. Id. at 897.
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school supplies," and Abshire bought an expensive gift for
Cooks' office.6 During the four months the case was pending,
Abshire's attorney, Sue Fontenot, spoke with Cooks on the tele-
phone everyday. "Fontenot acknowledges that she talked about
events as reported in newspaper accounts of the Abshire case."7
After the case was decided, Abshire helped redecorate Cooks'
office and Cooks did not pay Abshire for these services.8
While the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that these com-
munications did not constitute a violation of the judicial canon
prohibiting ex parte communications,9 the court held that Judge
Cooks' failure to recuse herself constituted punishable miscon-
duct.1" The court reasoned that, "where the circumstantial evi-
dence of bias or prejudice is so overwhelming that no reasonable
judge would hear the case, failure of ajudge to recuse herself is a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct as well as the Louisiana
Constitution."" In making this decision, the court relied on sev-
eral judicial canons and said:
[B]y violating the Constitution, such a serious failure to
recuse may constitute a breach of Canon 2, which states
that judges should "act at all times in a manner that pro-
motes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary," and perhaps Canon 1 as well, with its more
general exhortation to preserve the integrity of the judici-
ary through high standards of conduct.1
2
The repeated close personal contacts between the judge, the
party, and the lawyer provided overwhelming evidence of the
appearance of bias and prejudice.13
Harder cases arise. In Subway Restaurants, Inc. v. Kessler, 4 for
example, the sort of casual conversation that occurs in court-
houses led the parties to trouble. In that case, Judge Russell
imposed sanctions on attorney Duree. She was typing the deci-
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. See id. (citing LOuISIANA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A) (6)
(1996)). The court noted that when Judge Cooks visited Abshire, the Abshire
case was not pending before Judge Cooks. See id. at 901. As for the lawyer's
later discussions, the court was plainly inclined to think that they violated the
code of conduct but concluded that the evidence about the context of the calls
was inadequate to prove a violation by clear and convincing evidence, the rele-
vant standard of proof. See id. at 901-02.
10. See id. at 902-03.
11. Id. at 903.
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. 970 P.2d 526 (Kan. 1998).
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sion when attorney Gerstle, an old friend, stopped by chambers
to ask if the judge would like to "'go out and have a beer."' 15
Judge Russell told Gerstle that she was within a few sentences of
finishing something, and that she would go out when she was
done. Gerstle asked several times what she was typing. Finally,
Russell said, "'Well, it's a case called Subway versus Kessler and
Banks, and you don't know anything about it. Never been an
attorney in the case, you don't know anything about this."'' 6
Gerstle replied that he did know about the case, because he rep-
resented one of the parties, Nancy Kessler, in a separate criminal
action. Gerstle asked Russell what specifically she was writing.
Russell replied, "' [A] motion for sanctions against Mr. Duree.' "17
Gerstle said, "'Mr. Duree is a great guy. He's a really nice guy.
He paid my fees to represent Nancy Kessler."' 18
Judge Russell issued the opinion regarding Duree's sanc-
tions, and then recused herself.19 The judge who handled the
case after Russell's recusal upheld the sanctions on the basis that
Russell was unbiased when she decided the matter.2 ° The
Supreme Court of Kansas held that, while Russell should have
recused herself before issuing the opinion, her successor did not
abuse his discretion in denying Duree's motion to alter the sanc-
tions.2 1 The court noted, however, that the ex parte communica-
tion, generally, and "Gerstle's professional curiosity and
persistent questioning of Judge Russell as she sat behind her
word processor," specifically, were both inappropriate.22
Friendship with a lawyer led to discipline even though the
lawyer had no connection with the cases at issue. In Judicial Pro-
ceedings Against Tesmer,23 Judge Tesmer asked her law professor
friend to "prepare opinions on dispositive motions in cases over
which she presided."24 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held
that these ongoing and persistent discussions between judge and
law professor "violated the prohibition of private communica-
tions designed to influence a judge's decision."25 In so holding,
the court relied on the ex parte prohibition contained in its
Code of Judicial Conduct. The court said:
15. Id. at 531.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 532.
21. See id. at 533.
22. Id. at 536.
23. 580 N.W.2d 307 (Wis. 1998).
24. Id. at 309.
25. Id.
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Judge Tesmer's discussions with a person outside of and
unconnected with the judicial system concerning disposi-
tive motions in proceedings pending before her outside
the presence and without the knowledge of the parties to
those proceedings constituted ex parte communications as
that term is used in [Code of Judicial Conduct, SCR 60.04
(1)(g)]. The ex parte communication prohibition set
forth in the current [SCR 60.04(1) (g)] now makes explicit
what was implicit in its predecessor. The affirmative state-
ment introducing the current prohibition states, "A judge
shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a
proceeding, or to that person's lawyer, the right to be
heard according to law." 26
The court imposed a modest sanction, however, because it deter-
mined that Judge Tesmer did not know her use of Professor
McCormack's assistance violated the prohibition. 27 Because her
violation was not willful, the Wisconsin Supreme Court merely
reprimanded her, the least severe of the four forms of discipline
the court could impose under the constitution. 21
A more ordinary relationship led to a recusal order in Deren
v. Williams.29 In that case, Deren was involved in a medical mal-
practice suit that resulted in three trials. About two months after
his second trial had concluded, Deren moved to disqualify Judge
Williams. ° The motion was denied solely on the basis that it was
untimely filed.3
Deren provided the Florida District Court of Appeals an affi-
davit stating three reasons why he feared he would not receive a
fair trial, among them thatJudge Williams and plaintiffs counsel
were old friends and had engaged in ex parte communications
during the previous two trials.32 On appeal, the court could not
agree whether the judge's relationship with the lawyer in ques-
tion mattered. Two judges of the Court of Appeals thought that
the motion to disqualify should have been granted, concluding
that "the continued expression of . . . sympathy [toward the
plaintiff] and the manifestation of a close friendship with oppos-
ing counsel, coupled with ex parte communications during trial,
26. Id. at 316.
27. See id. at 318. This requirement is grafted onto Wisconsin's Code of
Judicial Ethics by statute.
28. The remaining options are censure, suspension and removal from the
bench. See id. (quoting Wis. CONST. art VII, § 11).
29. 521 So.2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
30. See id. at 151.
31. See id.
32. See id.
20001
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would reasonably cause a litigant to be apprehensive of the fair-
ness of the trial judge. 33
A dissenting judge thought the untimeliness of the motion
was especially pertinent, noting that Deren was well aware of his
asserted grounds for disqualification throughout both trials and
numerous post-trial motions.34 He said, "A motion to disqualify
the judge filed some 21/2 years after the facts are known comes
too late. '3 5  He additionally dissented on the grounds that
Deren's assertions did not indicate a well-founded fear that
Judge Williams was biased, and that the claims were so vague as
to be legally insufficient. 36
Ultimately, the touchstones for the ground rules on commu-
nications are even-handedness and due process. The lawyer or
the client who has been "back-doored" knows when it has hap-
pened. Still, during the course of a busy day in a courthouse, all
sorts of administrivia passes between various actors under circum-
stances that no objective observer would deem to violate these
goals. 'Judge, my client says he'll plead if the prosecutor recom-
mends probation. Is that a deal you might approve?" 'Yes, prob-
ably, but I'd like to hear what the prosecutor says about it.
Subject to reading the presentence report it sounds all right."
While we tend to label such communications as improper, they
advance the practice of litigation. Our profession not only con-
dones these conversations, it relies on them. We usually sanction
the participants when some unexpected force arises, like a run-
away client who complains loudly.
II. "THEY'RE ALL A PART OF THE SAME CROWD"
Once it would have been thought utterly ordinary that
judges belonged to a bar association. Indeed, someone seeking a
judicial appointment or running for judge would have thought it
virtually obligatory to belong to the local, state, and national
33. Id. at 152. The majority's opinion is not specific about the nature of
the friendship or the alleged ex parte discussions, but it does offer a useful
observation on attorney-judge friendships:
Almost all who practice law recognize that most judges are capa-
ble of numbering among their friends some of the attorneys who
appear before them. But few attorneys are articulate enough to
explain to their clients that the fact that opposing counsel and the
trial judge shared a cup of coffee at the local coffee shop during the
last recess was no cause for alarm. The test has to be how does the
litigant reasonably view the remarks or conduct of the judge.
Id.
34. See id. at 152-53.
35. Id. at 153.
36. See id.
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associations. What was once thought de rigeur, however, is no
longer taken for granted.
The model code covering judges explicitly encourages
judges to participate in bar associations.37 This participation is
heralded by bar leaders3" and judicial leaders often exhort their
colleagues to participate in these activities.39 Judges have special
contributions to make in these forums.
Still, there have been warning signs that judges' bar mem-
berships may conflict with their ethical obligations. Judge Wil-
liam M. Aker, Jr. resigned from the American Bar Association in
1993 because he felt the need to avoid impropriety in his activi-
ties and to demonstrate that he was not swayed by partisan inter-
ests associated with bar membership.4" Explaining his decision
to resign after forty years, Judge Aker observed that litigants have
37. "A judge may serve as an officer, director, trustee or non-legal advisor
of an organization or governmental agency devoted to the improvement of the
law, the legal system or the administration of justice .... " MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 4(C)(3) (1990).
38. J. Lee McNeely, former President of the Indiana State Bar Association
stated:
We have been fortunate in Indiana that, through the years, most
judges on our various courts have elected to retain their membership
in the ISBA. In fact, not only do our judges typically retain their mem-
bership in the Association, but they generally continue to participate
in the Association's work, attend our meetings, and support our
programs.
J. Lee McNeely, Celebrate the Law Sept. 28-30, REs GESTAE, Aug. 1999, at 5. Simi-
larly, Chic Born, also a former President of the ISBA, has stated:
I believe that the citizenry is best served, that notions of neutral
justice are best available and that there is generally more access to
equal justice, when an independent judiciary exists. Bar associations
play a legitimate role in protecting this judicial independence.
To tell its side of the story, the judiciary may choose to seek the
help of bar associations. Local associations are generally the best
placed to respond, but the state bar association may act as well in cer-
tain cases.
S.R. ("Chic") Born, judicial Independence: News and Views, REs GESTAE, Aug.
1998, at 5.
39. As for those judges who believe that the ABA has been hijacked
by political interests within its membership, I suggest that the only
rational course of action is not withdrawal, but engagement on the
matters of direct interest to courts. Judges are the figures who can
best exert influence over matters affecting the profession of law
because judges are the body of lawyers that a bar association must
accommodate.
Randall T. Shepard, What Judges Can Do About Legal Professionalism, 32 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REv. 621, 630 (1997).
40. Williams M. Aker, Jr., Why Judge Resigned from ABA, NAT'L L.J.,Jan. 25,
1993, at 17.
2000]
230 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
become less forgiving about judges' adherence to these duties
and cited informal information that a host of organizational affil-
iations were now off limits.41 Finally, he observed:
The American Bar Association, consciously or uncon-
sciously, has joined this list. It now routinely takes official
positions on issues upon which I and other judges likely
will be called upon to rule. The problem is exacerbated by
the fact that the ABA continues to perform a screening
function in the processing of federal judicial appointments
and therefore is in a position to exercise very real pressure
on judges.42
While Judge Aker articulated his reasons for leaving the ABA, he
was not the most prominent person to do so. The year before,
Chief Justice William Rehnquist resigned, an act widely thought
to be related to political issues."
This series of high profile decisions set in motion a discus-
sion within the American Bar Association itself. The Appellate
Judges Conference initiated a study of the participation ofjudges
in the association, culminating in a report, the Report of the
Commission on Judicial Participation in the American Bar Asso-
ciation, commonly called the "O'Scannlain Report" for the name
of its chair, Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit.44
This report reached a number of controversial conclusions.
These included a proposal that no judge should be an officer of
the association or serve on its board and thatjudges should have
a mechanism to disassociate themselves from ABA positions.45
41. Specifically, Judge Aker stated:
In recent years litigants have become more sensitive to this obliga-
tion on the part of the judicial officers before whom they appear, and
they are much more willing to file recusal motions when they have any
reason to doubt ajudge's impartiality in a particular matter because of
some organization to which the judge belongs.
No federal judge who takes . . . ethical admonitions seriously
could maintain membership in the National Rifle Association, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the National Organization for
Women or the Sierra Club, just to name a few of the many organiza-
tions that have agendas over which the courts more than just occasion-
ally preside.
Id.
42. Id.
43. See Editorial, And Furthermore . ATLANTAJ. & CONST., May 20, 1992,
at A8.
44. Appellate Judges Conference of the American Bar Association,
Report of the Commission on Judicial Participation in the American Bar Associ-
ation (Aug. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the American Bar
Association).
45. See id. at 67-68.
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It is difficult to assess the impact of these problems on ABA
membership. It is still the rule, rather than the exception, that
federal and state appellate judges belong to the association,4 6
including many of those who served on the O'Scannlain Com-
mission. On the other hand, membership by state trial judges is
very modest, no more than five or ten percent of the total.47
How much of this is attributable to political concern and how
much is attributable to finances is difficult to determine.
Still, in light of these recent high-profile resignations and
debates,judicial membership in bar associations remains at issue.
With regard to national bar activities, the solutions are complex.
Bar members remain tempted to take strong policy positions on
matters unrelated to the core concerns of the trade. Accord-
ingly, the ABA Board of Governors recently decided to urge the
House and other elements of the Association to foreswear on
many of these points. I would say this has been met with some
success.
III. THE LAWYER WHO DOESN'T LiKE ME
Most practitioners have had the experience of venturing
into a courtroom where the judge seemed to harbor an animus
against a particular lawyer. Perhaps more common is the experi-
ence of the attorney who concludes there is a circle of lawyers on
the judge's good side, and he is not one of them. This sort of
indefinite measure of the relationship between judge and lawyer
rarely works its way into definable outcomes.
More pointed are those situations in which the relationship
between the judge and the lawyer can be measured in some tan-
gible and visible way. Judges rarely make remarks on the record
about lawyers. I examine here situations in which the lawyer has
said something about the judge.
46. Compare ABA, JUDICIAL DIVISION MEMBERSHIP STATISTICS (Oct. 31,
1999) (812 members of the Appellate Judges Conference), with ADMIN. OFFICE
OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL REPORT FOR JUSTICES AND JUDGES OF THE
UNITED STATES (Nov. 1, 1999) (160 federal appellate judges active), and SUPPLE-
MENT TO EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1997: A NATIONAL PERSPEC-
TIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT (Brian J. Ostrom & Neal B. Kauder
eds., 1998) (1,304 state appellate judges active).
47. Compare ABA, supra note 46 (1,761 members of the National Confer-
ences of Special Court Judges and State Trial Judges), with EXAMINING THE
WORK OF STATE COURTS 1997: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STA-
TISTICS PROJECT (BrianJ. Ostrom & Neal B. Kauder eds., 1998) (28,560 general
and limited jurisdiction state trial judges).
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Stephen Yagman, a California practitioner, is a one-man lab-
oratory on this front. In Standing Committee v. Yagman,4 s Yagman
filed a lawsuit pro se against several insurance companies.49 He
promptly moved to disqualify the judge assigned to hear the case
on the basis of bias.5" The motion was randomly assigned to
Judge William Keller, who denied it and sanctioned Yagman for
pursuing the motion "in an 'improper and frivolous manner.'-51
A few days after the sanctions order, Yagman was quoted as
saying that Keller had a proclivity for sanctioning Jewish laywers,
which Yagman considered to be evidence of anti-Semitism.52
Yagman placed an advertisement in the Daily Journal asking law-
yers who had been sanctioned by Judge Keller to contact
Yagman's office.5" Yagman told reporters that Judge Keller was
"drunk on the bench,"54 and he sent a highly critical letter to the
Almanac of the Federal Judiciary.55
Another practitioner in the Central District of California
reported that "Yagman told him that, by leveling public criticism
atJudge Keller, Yagman hoped to get the judge to recuse himself
in future cases."5 6 That practitioner described Yagman's com-
ment in a letter to the Standing Committee on Discipline of the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. 57 The
Standing Committee and Yagman presented evidence at a two-
day hearing before the district court, and the court held that
Yagman had committed misconduct justifying sanctions and a
48. 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995).
49. See id. at 1433.
50. See id.
51. Id. at 1433-34 (quoting Yagman v. Republic Ins., 137 F.R.D. 310, 312
(C.D. Cal. 1991)).
52. See id. at 1434 (quoting Susan Seager, Judge Sanctions Yagman, Refers
Case to State Bar, L.A. DAILYJ., June 6, 1991, at 1).
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. See id. The letter stated:
It is an understatement to characterize the Judge as "the worst
judge in the central district." It would be fairer to say that he is igno-
rant, dishonest, ill-tempered, and a bully, and probably is one of the
worstjudges in the United States. If television cameras were permitted
in his courtroom, the other federal judges in the Country would be so
embarrassed by this buffoon that they would run for cover. One might
believe that some of the reason for this sub-standard human is the
recent acrimonious divorce through which he recently went: but talk-
ing to attorneys who knew him years ago indicates that, if anything, he
has mellowed. One other comment: his girlfriend .. , like the Judge
is a right-wing fanatic.
Id. at n.4.
56. See id.
57. See id.
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two-year suspension from practice in the Central District of
California.58
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the sanctions
against Yagman could not stand.59 While the court acknowl-
edged that "[] udge shopping doubtless disrupts the proper
functioning of the judicial system, ' it balanced the operation of
the courts against attorneys' First Amendment rights to criticize
the judges.6' The court concluded that the possibility of volun-
tary recusal was not so great as to amount to a clear and present
danger to fairjudicial administration.62 The court also dismissed
the notion that remarks like Yagman's could force the disqualifi-
cation of the judge at whom they are aimed.63 Finally, the court
stated:
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won
by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly
appraises the character of American public opinion. For it
is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind,
although not always with perfect good taste, on all public
institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited,
solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench,
would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and con-
tempt much more than it would enhance respect. 64
While Yagman's comments are, unfortunately, not unique-as
far as public vituperation by the lawyer is concerned-they do
arise in the unusual setting of the lawyer publicly criticizing the
judge to procure a recusal. More common is the situation in
which the lawyer has opposed the judge in an election for
confirmation.
In the case of United States v. Helmsley,65 for instance, Judge
Walker of the Southern District of New York held that attorney
Alan Dershowitz's criticism of and opposition to Walker's nomi-
nation and confirmation to the federal bench were not enough
to warrant judicial disqualification under federal statute16 or the
canons ofjudicial conduct. 67
58. See id. at 1435.
59. See id. at 1443.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 1444.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 1445.
65. 760 F.Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1998).
67. See 760 F.Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
2000]
234 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
Judge Walker began by holding that he was not actually
biased against Dershowitz or his client.6" Walker stated that he
was not concerned by Dershowitz's opposition to his appoint-
ment, because Dershowitz "was alone in expressing opposi-
tion."69 He added that he thought it not unusual for a judge to
preside over a case involving an attorney with whom he has had
prior acerbic relations. 70 He wrote, "It is one of the earliest and
most fundamental lessons of judging that a judge must rule on
the merits without regard to the personality of the attorney or
any unpleasant experiences the judge may have had with the
attorney in the past."71 Walker concluded that he had no reason
to question his own impartiality. 72
Judge Walker then discussed whether he appeared to be par-
tial in the Helmsley case. 73 He recognized the potential for abuse
by a litigant who wants to disqualify a judge simply because he
fears an adverse decision, and stated that "'the trial judge must
carefully weigh the policy of promoting public confidence in the
judiciary against the possibility that those questioning his impar-
tiality might be seeking to avoid the adverse consequences of his
presiding over his case.' ,,7 Ajudge is as much required to stay in
a case when there is no reason to leave as he is to recuse himself
when there is. 75 Litigants are entitled to an impartial judge, not
a judge of their choosing.76
In acknowledgement of the fact that Dershowitz's hostility
toward him could be perceived as translating into his hostility
toward Dershowitz, Judge Walker recited the rule that the
appearance of hostility on the part of a judge toward an attorney is
an insufficient basis for recusal.77 Rather, "Courts have ruled
68. See id. at 340-41.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 341.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 342 (quoting In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d
1307, 1313 (2d Cir. 1988)).
75. See id.
76. See id. Judge Walker might well have also taken notice of the fact that
vituperative attacks againstjudges by Dershowitz are a dime a dozen. For exam-
ple, Dershowitz assaulted Judge Gilbert Merritt of the Sixth Circuit for his opin-
ion in the case of alleged war criminalJohn Demjanjuk by callingJudge Merritt
"Demjanjuk's lawyer" and declaring, "clients are calling me and asking, 'What
do we have to do to get justice in the United States-kill jews?"' Ken Myers,
Under the Demjanjuk Spotlight: Unassuming Judge is Propelled to Center Stage, NAT'L
LJ., Aug. 30, 1993, at 31.
77. See United States v. Helmsley, 760 F.Supp. 338, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(citing, for example, In re Cooper, 821 F.2d 833 (lst Cir. 1987); In re Beard, 811
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that the appearance of judicial hostility or favoritism must be
toward a party to warrant recusal."7
Finally, considering Dershowitz's criticism on its own, Judge
Walker remarked that "the Second Circuit has found that hostile
attacks even by a criminal defendant, much less by the defend-
ant's lawyer, are not a sufficient basis for recusal."79 If the rule
were otherwise, Walker noted, "'litigants fortunate enough to
have easy access to the media could make charges that would
effectively veto the assignment of judges.'" 80 If litigants cannot
force recusal by criticism, similarly, attorneys may not do so.8
Judge Walker therefore concluded, "On all the circumstances,
and given the well established judicial rejection of a rule that
would permit a litigant or an attorney to disqualify a judge by
criticizing him, I find no circumstances arising from Mr. Dersho-
witz's opposition to my nomination that require my disqualifica-
tion" on the basis of the appearance of partiality.82
Similarly, in United States v. Oluwafemi,s3 Judge Gleeson
declined to recuse himself despite Oluwafemi's claim that his
attorney, Liotti, opposed the judge's confirmation. Using the
same analytical framework, Gleeson determined that, in light of
significant federal precedent, "the argument that an attorney's
criticisms require disqualification of the Court is particularly
•"84
unpersuasive.
Because the touchstone of this question is the judge's possi-
ble bias or prejudice concerning a party's lawyer,8 5 a claim that
the lawyer has opposed the judge must arise under circumstances
that are likely to produce an adverse reaction in the judge. In
Downs v. Smyk, s6 for instance, Smyk moved to disqualify Judge
F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1987); Moore v. McGraw Edison Co., 804 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir.
1986); United States v. Burt, 765 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1985)).
78. Id. (citing In re Cooper, 821 F.2d at 841 (holding that judge calling
attorney "untrustworthy manipulator" and describing his conduct as "dirty
work" did not warrant recusal)).
79. Id. (citing King v. United States, 576 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1978)).
80. Id. at 343 (quoting In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d
1307, 1309 (2d Cir. 1988)).
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. 883 F.Supp. 885 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
84. Id. at 892 (citing United States v. Helmsley, 760 F.Supp. 338, 342
(S.D. N.Y. 1991)).
85. "A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not lim-
ited to instances where: .. . the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concern-
ing a party or a party's lawyer.. . ." MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
3(E)(1)(a) (1990).
86. 685 P.2d 347 (Mont. 1984).
20001
236 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
Luedke on the basis that that the judge was biased due to Smyk's
overt campaign against Luedke's election. 7 The Supreme Court
of Montana dismissed Smyk's petition, because the judge was
completely unaware of Smyk's opposition to his election until
Smyk claimed it as a basis for recusal.8"
Sometimes, of course, similar non-relationships can beget
difficult situations. In the case of Tyson v. State,9 I recused myself
from Tyson's appeal from his conviction for rape, after learning
that my wife had discussed the case, briefly and innocently, with
Tyson's attorney, again Alan Dershowitz. Almost a year later,
after the Indiana Court of Appeals had affirmed the conviction
and the Supreme Court, sitting without me, had denied a request
to hear the appeal, Tyson claimed that my failure to participate
in the decision violated his right to due process of law. His peti-
tion requesting that I participate in the appeal after it was con-
cluded was denied.9 ° The state judge who conducted the trial
and the U.S. District Judge who heard the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus received about the same treatment.91
IV. 'JUDGE, I'M GOING TO DO A LAND DEAL."
Judges and lawyers stand at most of the economic crossroads
in modern life. When a business venture is put together (or for
that matter, when it falls apart), the principals usually call their
lawyers for assistance. Judges are not far removed from these
circles.
Thus, discussions about business events and opportunities
abound in the venues where lawyers and judges ply their trade.
When lawyers and judges join hands in such matters, however,
the results are almost always disastrous.
The warnings to judges are fairly straightforward. The provi-
sions of Indiana Judicial Conduct Canon 4 advise on business
activities generally and state:
(1) Ajudge shall not engage in financial or business deal-
ings that:
may reasonably be perceived to exploit the judge's
judicial position; involve the judge in frequent transac-
87. See id. at 348.
88. See id.; see also Oluwafemi, 883 F.Supp. at 892.
89. 622 N.E.2d 457 (Ind. 1993).
90. See id. at 461.
91. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBT 145 (1996) ("Moreover,
the trial judge, Patricia Gifford, made numerous rulings she never would have
gotten away with had the case been nationally televised."); Tyson Appeal Denied,
INDtANAPOLIs NEWS, Mar. 7, 1994, at A8 ("'I'll be glad when we can get this case
out of Indiana,' said Dershowitz.").
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tions or continuing business relationships with those
lawyers or other persons likely to come before the
court on which the judge serves. 2
Similarly, Canon 3(E) provides for disqualification in particular
matters where the judge has a direct interest.93 But what about
instances in which the judge has no interest in the matter itself,
but has a business relationship with a lawyer involved in the case?
Several cases demonstrate this problem. In In re Lemoine, 4
Judge Lemoine, who was elected as a part-time city judge, was
censured for frequently engaging in financial dealings with attor-
neys who were likely to appear before him, among other things. 5
Due to the part-time nature of his office, he continued to prac-
tice law in the same community where he was ajudge. He shared
office space with attorney Harold A. Vandyke, III, and the build-
ing where they worked bore a sign reading, "Lemoine-Van Dyke
Law Center."9' 6 Another attorney, Michael A. Brewer, began
renting office space from Judge Lemoine after his appointment.
Lemoine and Van Dyke generally split attorney's fees between
them, either on a 50/50 or a 55/45 basis. 97 Two and a half years
after Judge Lemoine took the bench, he entered into a formal
agreement with Brewer, whereby Lemoine agreed to pay
Brewer's overhead and incidentals in exchange for a share of the
legal fees Brewer earned.9 8
During his tenure, Judge Lemoine presided over thirty-two
cases in which one of the litigants was represented by either Van
Dyke or Brewer. While Lemoine did not share fees in any of
those cases, he recused himself in only one.99 The Louisiana
Supreme Court publicly censured Judge Lemoine for miscon-
duct stemming in part from his business dealings with Van Dyke
and Brewer.1 ° ° The court said that it would have been inclined
toward a more severe sanction had Judge Lemoine not lost his
seat on the bench during an intervening election. 0 1 Sometimes
democracy works faster than the disciplinary system.
92. INDIANA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(D) (1) (1989).
93. "A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Id. Canon 3(E) (1).
94. 686 So.2d 837 (La. 1997), modified on reh'g by 692 So.2d 358 (La.
1997).
95. See id. at 838.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 838-39.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 846.
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In In re Means,1° 2 Family Law Master Means was repri-
manded for declining to disqualify himself in a case involving a
litigant represented by an attorney who co-owned a corporation
with Means.1"' The Means family home was located on corpora-
tion land, and Master Means paid no rent. When Means
declined the other party's motion to disqualify, that party com-
plained to the Judicial Investigation Commission, who found
probable cause to believe that Means violated Judicial Canon
5(C) (1).1"4 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
agreed with the Commission and reprimanded Master Means for
failing to disqualify. 10 5 Reasoning that "it is impermissible for a
judge to have continuing financial and business dealing with a
lawyer who appears before the judge," the court determined that
the joint ownership of the corporation and the location of
Means' home on corporation property "is an impermissible
financial and business interest under the . . . Canon."10 6
A lesser financial interest played a role in In re Druy.10 7
Judge Drury was removed from office for taking a $2,000 loan
from an attorney, failing to disclose it, and continuing to preside
over cases at which the attorney appeared." 8 The judge con-
tacted an attorney who regularly appeared in his court, Yosha,
about obtaining a loan.10 9 He borrowed the money, but failed to
report it in his Statement of Economic Interests until the Indiana
Commission on Judicial Qualifications brought charges against
him.1 10 During the four-year period that Drury owed Yosha, he
continued to preside over cases in which Yosha's firm repre-
sented the litigants. The Indiana Supreme Court held that "by
soliciting, accepting and failing to report the . . . loan," Drury
violated Judicial Canons 1, 2, 3(C), 5(C)(1), and 5(C) (4) (c).1 11
In other words:
[Drury] should not have sought or accepted the loan.
Once he did accept it, he should have disqualified himself
from all cases in which Yosha's law firm was involved. At
the least, [Drury] should have disclosed the loan to the
102. 452 S.E.2d 696 (W.Va. 1994).
103. See id. at 697.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 698-99.
107. 602 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind. 1992).
108. See id. at 1001.
109. See id. at 1002.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 1004.
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other parties and attorneys involved in any lawsuit over
which [he] presided which involved Yosha's law firm.' 12
As a result of this and other misconduct, Drury was removed
from the bench." 3
Public confidence in the profession is gravely impaired
where judges and lawyers are casual about their economic deal-
ings. While the temptations are considerable, we should not sub-
ject citizens to a system in which it is apparent that the leading
participants have their own finances at stake.
V. "TAKE BOTH CONTRIBUTIONS AND DECIDE THE CASE
ON THE MERITS" '1 1 4
Generally, we lawyers and judges think of judicial ethical
issues as exclusively involving whether the judge had an interest
in the outcome of the litigation or had a special relationship with
the party. We have tended to pass over a judge's relationship
with the party and, therefore, we have tended to pass over the
related question of campaign contributions by lawyers.
Without dwelling at length on the details of modern Ameri-
can judicial campaigning, let me set the background by mention-
ing a few aspects of this problem. First, the skyrocketing cost of
running for public office has hardly passed the judiciary by. In
the thirty-nine states where judges are elected at some level, the
cost of judicial races is rising at least as quickly as congressional
races and presidential campaigns." 5 Candidates for the bench
now pay for sophisticated ads, consultants, and polls through
contributions from the tobacco industry, casinos, insurance com-
panies, doctors, and other businesses.1 1 6
112. Id.
113. See id. at 1011.
114. I take this tide from the presumably apocryphal story about the
Texas judge who was visited one day by a lawyer with a major case long pending
in front of him. "Your Honor," said the lawyer, "my client believes his case is
being well-handled and wishes to see it ably completed but he's worried about
the upcoming election and wants to make a $10,000 contribution to your cam-
paign." The judge thanked the lawyer for this offer and went off to ponder the
ethics of the encounter. He finally decided he had an obligation to report it to
counsel for the opposing party. That lawyer responded, "Judge, my client also
likes the way you have been managing this case and would no doubt want to
contribute $10,000 to your race." After lengthy consideration, the judge
reached an equitable and ethical solution: take both contributions and decide
the case on the merits.
115. Sheila Kaplan & Zoe Davidson, The Buying of the Bench, NATIO, Jan.
26, 1998, at 1.
116. See id.
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Second, modern campaign reporting requirements and the
computerization of records have made it possible to document
what judges have known for a long time-that the great bulk of
the funds used to run for judicial office come from lawyers and
the client groups they represent. Perhaps more obviously, we
can now document that money tends to flow from a particular
side of the plaintiff-defendant division existing in civil law. 17
Analyzing this problem as lawyers and judges has led us to
ignore the apparent conflict even under circumstances where
many in the public would do otherwise. In River Road Neighbor-
hood," '8 for example, the City of San Antonio was an appellant in
a case in which South Texas Sports, Inc. was an appellee. The
City of San Antonio moved to disqualify two justices on the Court
of Appeals. The motion was based on the fact that one justice
had received approximately 21.7% of his total campaign contri-
butions from one of South Texas Sports' owners while another
justice had received 17.1% of his total campaign contributions
from the chairman of South Texas Sports' board of directors." 9
The challenged justices refused to recuse themselves and
instead referred the matter to the other members of the court
who decided, en banc, to deny the motion.121 The court
reasoned:
City does not assert that either of the two challenged Jus-
tices is related to any party in this case or that either has
been counsel in this case. There remains only the question
concerning disqualification because of "interest."
"It is a settled principle of law that the interest which
disqualifies a judge is that interest, however small, which
rests upon a direct pecuniary or personal interest in the
result of the case presented to the judge or court." It is not
contended that either of the challenged Justices may gain
or lose anything of a pecuniary or personal nature because
of any judgment which might be rendered in this case.121
117. For example, in Texas, Chief Justice Thomas Phillips raised
$486,809 of his 1996 re-election funds from corporate defense lawyers;
$213,016 from energy and natural-resource companies; and $159,498 from
finance, insurance and real estate firms. In OhioJustice Evelyn Stratton raised
$74,885 from finance, insurance and real estate firms; $134,900 from lawyers
and lobbyists; and $16,476 from medical interests. Finally, in a high-profile Ala-
bama race, businesses determined to defeat incumbent Justice Kenneth Ingra-
ham contributed more than $668,704 to opponent Harold See's campaign. See
id at 1-2.
118. 673 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. App. 1984).
119. See id.
120. Id. at 953.
121. Id. (citation omitted).
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Alabama has addressed the issue of disclosure along the
same lines. In Ex parte Kenneth D. McLeod Partnership,122 Katie
McLeod filed a complaint against the Kenneth D. McLeod Fam-
ily Limited Partnership and Monroe McLeod, her former hus-
band. Several weeks later, Monroe McLeod contributed to the
trial judge's campaign for election to the state appellate court,
and the trial judge included the contribution in her "Summary of
Contributions and Expenditures" filed with the Secretary of
State. 123 The case was tried without ajury and was decided unfa-
vorably for Katie. Katie then filed a motion for a new trial based,
in part, on Monroe's campaign contribution.' 2 4 The trial court
denied the motion.
On appeal, Katie argued that the trial judge should have dis-
closed the campaign contribution to her as she did not learn of
the contribution until after judgment had been entered, thus
denying her the opportunity to move for recusal. The Alabama
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial judge did not
abuse its discretion in denying Katie's motion. Since the judge's
disclosure form was on file with the Secretary of State's office, the
contribution was a matter of public record and discoverable by
Katie's counsel.1 25 Moreover, the court said:
Furthermore, [requiring the trial judge to disclose the con-
tribution] would wrongly expand the duties of judges and
would place an unreasonably heavy burden on the judici-
ary .... If a judge failed altogether to publicly disclose the
contributions she has received, or if she actively concealed
them, then an appearance of impropriety would exist. But
the judge in this case publicly reported the contribution
and in no way attempted to cover up the fact that Monroe
McLeod had made a contribution to her.' 26
Continued public and media pressure on this topic has led
to renewed efforts at reform. In 1997, ABA President Jerome
Shestack established a blue-ribbon task force to study ethics
issues created when lawyers contribute to political campaigns.
This task force was aptly named the Task Force on Pay to Play.127
122. 725 So.2d 271 (Ala. 1998).
123. Id. at 272.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 273.
126. Id.
127. See ABA President Shestack Names "Pay to Play" Panel Members to Study
Lawyer Campaign Contributions (visited Nov. 22, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/
media/sep97/payplay.html>. "Pay to Play" is a phrase used to describe a situa-
tion where contributions are a quid pro quo for eligibility to bid on government
contracts or to receive legal work from cities and states. See id.
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In its report to the ABA, the Task Force urged several proposals
regarding contributions to judicial campaigns. Among these
proposals was a recommendation to amend the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct to require judges to recuse themselves from
hearing a case in which a litigant or lawyer contributed to the
judge's campaign in an amount exceeding a specified limit if the
lawyer for the opposing side moves for such recusal. 128
As with the problem of the lawyer who makes negative com-
ments about the judge in order to obtain a change of judge, the
political campaign contribution rules can be used in the same
way. And they are. In Ex parte Bryant,129 for example, the peti-
tioner was involved in a criminal trial and his case was assigned to
Judge Galanos. The petitioner filed a motion seeking to have
Judge Galanos recused, which was denied. On the Saturday
before his trial, Judge Galanos notified the State that the peti-
tioner had contributed $500 to the judge's campaign. 3 ° The
petitioner then amended his motion to have Judge Galanos
recused based upon this information. Judge Galanos again
denied the motion. 131
On appeal, the petitioner contended that Judge Galanos
should have recused himself because the petitioner contributed
to the judge's campaign. Noting the somewhat odd circum-
stances, the appellate court nonetheless determined that the
petitioner was entitled to the protections afforded by the Canons
of Judicial Ethics even though he was the party who made the
campaign contribution.13 2 Still, the court held that the motion
was properly denied. In so holding, the court said: "The test for
recusal is not whether the judge is impartial but whether another
person 'might reasonably question the judge's impartiality.' ,133
Thus the fact that a defendant made a campaign contribution to
a judge does not mandate the recusal of the judge from any pro-
ceeding involving the defendant.13 1
An alternative approach is the general limitation on the
amount of money that a candidate can raise and spend in a judi-
cial election. As the Ohio experience demonstrates, however,
this method can be constrained by First Amendment considera-
128. ABA Task Force On Political Contributions Urges Disclosure Among Other
Recommendations Addressing "Pay to Play" (visited Nov. 22, 1999) <http://www.
abanet.org/media/ju198/play798.html>.
129. 675 So.2d 552 (Ala. Ct. App. 1996).
130. See id. at 553.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 554.
133. Id. at 555.
134. See id.
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tions. In 1995, the Ohio Supreme Court amended its judicial
canons to establish spending limits for judicial candidates. The
limits ranged from $500,000 for someone seeking to become
chief justice of the state, to $50,000 for candidates to a county or
municipal court.13 5 Several judges from Ohio's common pleas
courts filed suit seeking to enjoin and declare the canons uncon-
stitutional. The federal district court enjoined enforcement of
the canon setting limits on campaign expenditures.136
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision, relying on Buckley v. Valeo.1 37 The Sixth Cir-
cuit balanced Ohio's interest in alleviating corruption and the
appearance of corruption with First Amendment considerations
and determined that the expenditure limitations were not nar-
rowly tailored to redress the problem.13 ' The court said: "Simply
put, there are other avenues available to Defendants to prevent
corruption or the appearance of corruption, but, a limitation on
campaign expenditures is not one of them.
1 39
At the end of the day, it is difficult to see how our profession
can manage to deal with this problem so long as there are
elected judges. The judiciary has been reluctant to affirm the
constitutionality of restraining judicial candidates from promis-
ing particular results in the cases they will hear if elected.14 ° If
we cannot enforce such restraint, it seems unlikely that we will
successfully curb donations from lawyers to judicial campaigns.
CONCLUSION
Lawyers and judges do so many things that help make ours a
decent and prosperous society, like achieving compensation for
the injured, combating discrimination, and punishing crime. We
accomplish these ends through a working relationship character-
ized by both distance and close-order cooperation. How well we
perform this unique balancing act makes an important differ-
ence in public and client confidence in what we do. Our profes-
sion and the legal system will be most likely to thrive if lawyers
135. Richard Carelli, High Court Rejects Vote Spending Limit, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, at A8.
136. See Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 525 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 890 (1999).
137. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
138. See Suster, 149 F.3d at 533.
139. Id.
140. See Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty injudi-
cial Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1074-76 (1996) (discussing Buckley v.
Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993)).
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and judges alike regularly take the time to examine the best ways
to order our relationship.
